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IMMUNE UNDER SECTION 1983-
MONELL V. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT
OF SOCIAL SERVICES
For a number of years, actions based on section 19831 and other civil
rights statutes have been a source of considerable litigation in federal
courts. 2 Attempts have been made under those statutes to vindicate alleged
deprivations of constitutional guarantees. Whether a municipality could be
liable for such conduct under section 1983 was first significantly addressed
by the United States Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape.3 In that case, the
Court held that officers of local governments could be liable for civil dam-
ages under section 1983, 4 but it declined to include municipal corporations
within the ambit of the term "person," thereby immunizing them from such
liability. 5
The progeny of Monroe, viz., Moor v. County of Alameda,0 City of
Kenosha v. Bru no, 7 and Aldinger v. Howard,8 had all but closed the federal
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (.1970) provides in pertinent part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by
law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal
rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) is the jurisdictional counterpart to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 16 (1976); Examining Bd. of Engineers v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572,
583-84 (1976).
2. The number of civil rights suits filed nationwide in 1960 was 280, (1960) Ad. Off. U.S.
Courts Ann. Rep. 232, table C2 (1961); in 1970: 3,985, (1970) Ad. Off. U.S. Courts Ann. Rep.
232, table C2 (1971); and in 1977: 13,113, (1977) Ad. Off. U.S. Courts Ann. Rep. table C2
(1977). There is no specific breakdown of § 1983 actions. The other civil rights statutes include
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(a)-(e) 15 (1970).
3. 365 U.S. 1.67 (1961). The plaintiff alleged that Chicago police officers broke into his
home, ransacked it while he and his family were forced to stand naked in the living room and
detained him at the police station for ten hours before he was released. The police acted with-
out a search or arrest warrant. Id. at 169.
4. Id. at 187.
5. Id. at 192.
6. 411 U.S. 693 (1973). See notes 19-23 and accompanying text infra.
7. 412 U.S. 507 (1973). See notes 24-26 and accompanying text infra.
8. 427 U.S. 1 (1976). See notes 27-29 and accompanying text infra.
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courthouse door to parties seeking relief against local governmental en-
tities. 9 To circumvent that precedent, some lower federal courts were
forced to rely upon inappropriate legal fictions, while others attempted to
halt that trend by a questionable analogy to the eleventh amendment. 10
Confusion often resulted and adequate relief was denied to section 1983
plaintiffs on numerous occasions. 1 1
In Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 1 2 the Supreme
Court overruled the Monroe municipal immunity doctrine and held that
municipalities and other local governmental entities are "persons" under sec-
tion 1983.13 Therefore, they now can be sued for monetary, declaratory or
injunctive relief when the conduct in question "implements or executes" a
policy, rule or regulation adopted by the governmental unit.14 Also, "gov-
ernmental custom" was held to be a source of actionable conduct under sec-
tion 1983.15 The Court, however, refused to impute liability to a municipal
9. These include entities such as counties and local agencies. See Levin, The Section 1983
Municipal Immunity Doctrine, 65 GEo. L.J. 1483, 1485-87 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Levin];
Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1133, 1194 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law]. See also notes 31-34 and accompanying text
infra.
10. See notes 39, 41-42 and accompanying text infra.
11. See Levin, supra note 9, at 1494-1519. Levin cogently traces the expansion of the
Monroe immunity doctrine by the holdings of Moor and Kenosha and then analyzes the use of
the official capacity suit as a way to circumvent that Supreme Court precedent. Finally he
indicates how other lower federal courts halted that trend through the wrongful use of an anal-
ogy to eleventh amendment cases. The salient point of his discussion is the confusion in the
lower federal courts caused by the municipal immunity doctrine. Developments in the Law,
supra note 9, at 1190-97. The authors point out, "Monroe and City of Kenosha have had the
effect of foreclosing, with few exceptions, an assertion of liability against entities resembling
municipal corporations." Id. at 1194. See generally Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities
Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 131 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Kates & Kouba]. In this article, the authors analyze how Monroe frustrated the goals of § 1983,
compensation of the injured plaintiff and deterrence of official abuses. Id. at 136. They called
for the reconsideration of Monroe. Id. at 167.
12. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
13. Id. at 690. Of added significance is the fact hat the Court overruled the Monroe munic-
ipal immunity doctrine without being directly asked to do so. The petitioner sought injunctive
relief and back pay only from the officials of the department and from the board under § 1983.
Brief for Petitioner at 3, Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
14. Id. at 690. The Court limited its holding to "local government units which are not
considered part of the State for eleventh amendment purposes." Id. at 690 n.54. See notes
70-72 and accompanying text infra.
15. Id. at 690-91. This custom could be the grounds for suit "even though such a custom has
not received formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels." Id. at 691.
See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). In Adickes the Court was confronted
with the § 1983 claim of a white schoolteacher who was denied service in a Mississippi restau-
rant while in the company of six black students and arrested for vagrancy when she left the
lunchroom. The Court held that she would have a valid § 1983 claim if she could show the
denial of service resulted from a state enforced custom of segregation of races in restaurants. Id.
at 173. Justice Harlan for the majority in describing "custom" wrote, "[a]lthough not authorized
by written law, such practices of state officials could well be so permanent and well settled as to
constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of law." Id. at 167-68.
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corporation for the tortious conduct of an employee under the doctrine of
respondeat superior. 16
This Note will examine the problems created by Monroe and its succes-
sors. It also will discuss the Monell opinion and examine its impact in three
key areas: the approaches taken by the lower federal courts when section
1983 actions involved local governmental entities; the status of school boards
vis-,h-vis municipal corporations in section 1983 suits; and the general pos-
ture assumed by the Burger Court with regard to civil rights litigation.
Finally, this Note will examine certain questions left unresolved by Monell.
MONROE AND ITS PROGENY
Monroe and the cases it spawned created confusion in the lower federal
courts faced with section 1983 suits against local governmental entities. The
source of that confusion was the tension between the Supreme Court's de-
cided devotion to its doctrine of municipal immunity and the statutory com-
mand of section 1983.17 In practical terms, that tension often translated into
the denial of adequate compensation for the deprivation of fundamental
rights. 18
16. 436 U.S. at 691. The Court rejected the two traditional arguments for imputing
responsibility, deterrence and spreading the loss, because it found that the 42nd Congress had
rejected them. Id. at 691-94.
17. The root cause of this tension lies in the relationship between the modern perception of
Federalism and the rationale for § 1983. Three principles germane to this area have been
suggested:
(1) States are 'independent' governments, not simply administrative subdivisions of
the national government.
(2) Consequently they must be allowed to perform some of the functions of gov-
ernment and they must be allowed to perform those functions 'effectively,' free of
undue federal impairment.
(3) But there are no specific governmental roles or areas of substantive lawmaking
or administrative competence wholly reserved to the states or entirely immune from
either federal preemption or the imposition of federal requirements and standards.
Developments in the Law, supra note 9, at 1178. The debate focuses on the tension between
the first two principles and the third. For recent examples of the modern approach to
Federalism, see generally National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (struck down
1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act which extended federal minimum wage and
maximum hour provisions to most state and local employers as matters to be confined within
state authority); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (states, not Congress, have the power
to establish voter qualifications in state and local elections).
18. See Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974)
(prisoner denied recovery from Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or Bureau of Corrections under
§ 1983 for their failure to protect plaintiff from assault by fellow prisoner known to be danger-
ous); Patrum v. City of Greensburg, Ky., 419 F.2d 1300 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
990 (1970) (City of Greensburg held to be immune under § 1983 from damages resulting from
unlawful arrest and beating of plaintiff by police officers); United States ex rel. Gettlemacher v.
County of Philadelphia, 413 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1046 (1970) (plaintiff
barred from recovering under § 1983 for improper medical treatment received while a state
prisoner); Moreno v. Henckel, 431 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1970) (former employee unable to collect
damages from City of San Antonio for unlawful dismissal from civil service position); Barbaccia
1979]
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Thus, in the first of the Monroe line of precedent, Moor v. County of
Alameda, 19 plaintiffs sought to circumvent the municipal immunity doctrine
by bringing a federal cause of action against Alameda County under both
sections 1983 and 1988.20 The latter provision allows federal courts to look
to state law where a federal law governing the action is absent or deficient in
provision of a remedy . 2  The Supreme Court, therefore, was asked to apply
section 1988 to enforce the provisions of section 1983, through the adoption
of a California law that would allow counties to be held vicariously liable
under section 1983.22 This argument was rejected in part because such an
action was thought to be contrary to the holding of Monroe that municipal
corporations were not liable for damages under section 1983.23
In the second of the cases that relied on Monroe, City of Kenosha v.
Bruno,24 the plaintiffs tried another strategy to avoid the municipal immun-
ity doctrine. Instead of seeking damages, they sought only declaratory and
injunctive relief against two Wisconsin cities for alleged deprivations of their
fourteenth amendment due process rights. 2 5  The Supreme Court emphati-
cally rejected this relief-based distinction, holding that municipalities never
could be liable under section 1983,26 either in equity or at law.
v. County of Santa Clara, 451 F. Supp. 260 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (plaintiffs denied recovery from
County of Santa Clara for unconstitutional taking of their property).
19. 411 U.S. 693 (1973). In this case, the plaintiffs filed federal and state claims against four
deputy sheriffs, the sheriff and the County of Alameda after they suffered injuries from the
wrongful discharge of a shotgun by one of the deputy sheriffs who was attempting to end a civil
disturbance. Under the California Tort Claims Act, counties could be held vicariously liable for
the torts of their officials. The plaintiffs argued that § 1988 could be construed to allow the
federal court to adopt the California law to enforce the provisions of § 1983.
20. Id.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970) provides:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the
provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for the protection of all persons in the
United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and
enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are
suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to
the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies
and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the
constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such
civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Con-
stitution and Laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said
courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in
the infliction of punishment on the party found guilty.
22. 411 U.S. 693, 696 (1973).
23. Id. at 706-10. Thus, the Court brought counties within the purview of Monroe and the
federal courthouse door closed a bit further.
24. 412 U.S. 507 (1973). In this case, appellees were denied renewal of their liquor licenses
by the cities of Kenosha and Racine because of alleged nude dancing in their establishments.
25. Id. at 508.
26. Id. at 513. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated, "[wie find nothing in the
legislative history discussed in Monroe, or in the language actually used by Congress, to suggest
that the generic word 'person' in § 1983 was intended to have a bifurcated application to munic-
[Vol. 28:429
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In the third of the cases fostered by Monroe, Aldinger v. Howard,27 the
Supreme Court turned back another attempt to circumvent the municipal
immunity doctrine. The plaintiff joined Spokane County as a party to her
state law claim and argued that under the doctrine of pendent party jurisdic-
tion 28 the federal court should hear her federal section 1983 claim against
the county treasurer, other county officials, and the county together with her
state law claim. The Supreme Court rejected that argument because Con-
gress, as Monroe had indicated, had not intended for local governmental
entities to be among those bodies over which the federal courts would have
original jurisdiction in section 1983 suits. 29
Thus, in these three cases, the Supreme Court had all but barred federal
relief under section 1983 for alleged deprivations of constitutional rights by
local governmental entities. 30 Also, although Monroe referred only to
ipal corporations depending on the nature of the relief sought against them." Id. at 513. There
is considerable argument to the contrary. See Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962)
(injunctive relief granted against discrimination practiced by municipal airport restaurant hold-
ing lease from city): Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (City of Atlanta enjoined
from refusing blacks the right to use public golf courses on substantially equal basis with
whites); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943) (claim seeking injunctive relief
against city and mayor would ordinarily be entertained by federal courts, but the Court decided to
interfere by injunction with threatened criminal prosecution in state court); Harkless v. Sweeny
Independent School Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971)
(school district and school district trustees were "persons" within 1983 where equitable relief
was sought).
27. 427 U.S. 1 (1976). In this case, the plaintiff was discharged without a hearing from her
job in the Spokane County Treasurer's office for allegedly living with her boyfriend, even
though her job performance was excellent. Id. at 3. She filed an action in federal district court
under § 1983 for a violation of her first, ninth and fourteenth amendment rights against the
county treasurer, other county officials and the county. Id. at 3-4. She also filed a state law
claim against the county on the basis of state law which waived sovereign immunity of the
county and provided for vicarious liability of the county for the torts of its officials. Id. at 4-5.
The Court held that Congress had not intended local governmental entities to be within the
jurisdictional reach of § 1983 and therefore that the county could not be brought into federal
court as a pendent party. Id. at 17.
28. See note 87 and accompanying text infra.
29. 427 U.S. 1, 17 (1976).
30. As a result of the Supreme Court's adherence to the municipal immunity doctrine in
Monroe and its progeny, plaintiffs sought to read directly into the fourteenth amendment a
cause of action against local governmental entities by relying on Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Court allowed damage action
against defendant under the fourth amendment for unlawful search and seizure). The lower
federal courts were split over allowing this type of action. See Hostrop v. Bd. of Junior Colleges,
523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1975); Wright v. Houston Indep.
School Dist., 393 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (allowing this type of claim). But see Jamison
v. McCurrie, 565 F.2d 483 (7th Cir. 1977); Smetanka v. Borough of Ambridge, 378 F. Supp.
1366 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (rejecting this- type of claim). In Monell, Justice Powell in concurrence
was the only member of the Court to speak to this question. He noted, "rather than
constitutionalize a cause of action against local government that Congress intended to create in
1871, the better course is to confess error and set the record straight, as the Court does today."
436 U.S. at 713 (Powell, J., concurring). The Court in a recent summary order apparently
1979]
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municipal corporations, the list of governmental entities held to be immune
eventually included townships, 3 1 municipal agencies, 32 states, 33 and state
agencies. 3 4
Because of Monroe and the cases that followed it, local governmental en-
tities were immune under section 1983. Although officers of those entities
were held liable in their individual capacities for the commission of constitu-
tional violations, 35 those officers often were judgment-proof. Thus a plain-
tiff's attempt at recovery under section 1983 frequently was frustrated.
36
However, several lower federal courts held local or state governmental units
financially accountable in cases involving attacks on government officers in
their official capacities. 37  This confusing development arose from the deci-
sion in Kenosha, in which the Court was silent on the question of the liabil-
ity of government leaders when sued in their official capacities rather than as
individuals.38
As a result, after Kenosha, plaintiffs began to sue officers such as a mayor
or a department head, in their official capacities "because he [the official] has
the authority to take any corrective action ordered," 39 even though he may
agreed with Justice Powell. In City of West Haven v. Turpin, 99 S. Ct. 554 (1978), the Court
vacated a decision of the Second Circuit which allowed a damage action to be brought against a
municipality directly under the fourteenth amendment. Presumably the rationale in so holding
was their decision in Monell.
31. See, e.g., Pressman v. Chester Township, 307 F. Supp. 1084 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
32. See, e.g., Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 503 F.2d 1236 (6th Cir. 1974) (city planning
commission); United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d
799 (5th Cir. 1974) (county planning board). The theory was that these agencies were "but
arms" of the municipal government.
33. See, e.g., Cheramie v. Tucker, 493 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868
(1974) (states and arms of state government are not "persons" under § 1983).
34. See, e.g., Sykes v. State of California (Dept. of Motor Vehicles), 497 F.2d 197 (9th Cir.
1974).
35. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961). See Wirth v. Surles, 562 F.2d 319 (4th Cir.
1977) (Court reversed and remanded a district court decision that denied plaintiff damages
under § 1983 from South Carolina highway patrolman who took plaintiff into custody, removed
him from Georgia, and returned him to South Carolina without extraditing him); Lehman v.
City of Pittsburgh, 474 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1973) (city officials and employees could be liable under
§ 1983 for depriving plaintiff of opportunity to apply for civil service job because of durational
residency ordinance).
36. Kates & Kouba, supra note 11, at 136.
37. See Burt v. Bd. of Trustees, 521 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1975) (school board members could
be sued for equitable relief, including backpay, in their official capacities under § 1983); Incar-
cerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1974) (county sheriff sued in
official capacity could be liable for attorney's fees as part of equitable award under § 1983);
Freitag v. Carter, 489 F.2d 1377 (7th Cir. 1973) (award of damages against Commissioner of
City of Public Vehicle License Commission in his official capacity).
38. Levin, supra note 9, at 1497. Levin identifies the Court's silence as the "Kenosha
loophole" which allowed § 1983 plaintiffs to sue officers in their official capacities while recover-
ing from the governmental entity for which that officer served, thereby avoiding a judgment-
proof individual officer and an immune governmental unit. Id.
39. Levin, supra note 9, at 1497. In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme
Court held that the eleventh amendment does not confer sovereign immunity upon an indi-
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have played no actual part in the wrongdoing. Under this theory depart-
ments of government and governments themselves, supposedly shielded by
the Monroe immunity, were having to pay money damages, as part of an
equitable award., in section 1983 actions. 40 Accordingly, some of the lower
federal courts had succeeded at least partially in circumventing Monroe.4 1
Recognizing the practical consequences of official capacity relief, several
other circuits rejected that approach. They did so, however, by way of an
inappropriate analogy to cases involving the eleventh amendment. 42 For
example, the Second Circuit, in Monell,4 3 reasoned that just as the eleventh
amendment had been held to bar awards of retroactive money damages
from a state treasury, 44 by analogy, so should section 1983 be seen as for-
bidding the payment of money damages in the form of back pay from munic-
ipal coffers. 45 The Fifth Circuit applied the eleventh amendment approach
and held that it precluded even injunctive or declaratory relief in the form of
monetary compensation from a municipal treasury. 46
Thus, the post-Monroe atmosphere in the federal courts was one of confu-
sion as they groped for a way to reconcile the reality of damage caused by
vidual state officer acting in his or her official capacity. Id. at 160. Plaintiffs attempting to utilize
the official capacity suit as a method of recovery thus relied on the Young pleading fiction and
sued the government officer while recovering from the governmental entity. Levin, supra note
9, at 1499. See note 37 supra.
40. Typically this result is accomplished pursuant to an indemnification statute, see ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 85, § 7-102 (1977), or a judgment tax fund, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 8-1-16
(1977).
41. See note 37 supra.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XI provides: "The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
This amendment consistently has been held to be a bar to suits against a state by its own
residents. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Several commentators harshly have
criticized the eleventh amendment analogy approach. Levin, supra note 9, at 1508-14. They
argue that the eleventh amendment was designed to inhibit the federal courts from reaching
into state treasuries, while the Reconstruction Congress intended § 1983 to be a broad remedial
measure.
43. 532 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1976).
44. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The plaintiffs in that case sought injunctive and
declaratory relief against Illinois state officials for alleged constitutional violations in their ad-
ministration of the federal-state program of Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled. The Court
held that the eleventh amendment barred the payment of retroactive payments because those
payments would come from the state treasury although sought from a state official.
45. 532 F.2d 259, 265 (1976). The Court stated, however, that officers sued in their official
capacities are "persons" under § 1983 when sued for declaratory or injunctive relief. See
Rochester v. White, 503 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1974) (officials sued in official capacities are "per-
sons" under § 1983).
46. Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 528 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (firemen and
policemen sued the City of San Antonio, the pension fund board of trustees, and the individual
trustees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as well as their
mandatory contributions to the city pension fund). See note 69 infra.
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municipalities with the fact that the Supreme Court would not allow those
bodies to be held accountable. As a result, many section 1983 plaintiffs in
effect were forced to bear the cost of a violation of their constitutional rights.
THE MONELL DECISION
Factual Background
Jane Monell and other female employees of the Department of Social Serv-
ices and the Board of Education of New York City in 1971 brought a class
action under section 1983 in federal district court against the department
and its commissioner, the board and its chancellor and the City of New York
and its mayor. Seeking injunctive relief and back pay, the plaintiffs claimed
that the department officials and the board, pursuant to official policy, had
compelled them as pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence
before they were medically required to do so.47
The district court considered the claim for equitable relief to be moot
because the city and the board had changed the policy in question sub-
sequent to the filing of the action. 48  With regard to the claim for back pay,
it held that while the policy was unconstitutional, 49 cases interpreting the
eleventh amendment indicated that the city could not be required to award
such moneys consistent with Monroe.50 The Second Circuit affirmed the
opinion of the lower court. 51
The Monell Opinion
Faced with these facts, the Supreme Court, as it had done in
Monroe, looked to the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 for
guidance. 52 The Ku Klux Klan Act of 187153 was a manifestation of the
47. 436 U.S. at 660-62. (The reader may find note two on page 661 helpful).
48. 394 F. Supp. 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Plaintiffs also amended their complaint to charge
that the policy violated the 1972 amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at
854-55. That amendment added the government as an employer potentially liable under Title
VII. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII 703, 42 U.S.C. §2000(e)-2000(e)-15 (1970). The district
court held that the amendment was enacted after the complaint was amended and could not be
applied retroactively. Id. at 856.
49. Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). In that case, the Court struck
down mandatory school board rules requiring pregnant teachers to take maternity leave four
months prior to delivery as violative of fourteenth amendment due process requirements be-
cause an irrebuttable presumption that the teachers otherwise would be physically unfit to teach
was created. Id. at 651.
50. 394 F. Supp. 853, 855 (1975). See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). See note 44
,supra.
51. 532 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1976). See note 43 supra.
52. Kates and Kouba indicated that reliance on legislative history on any occasion is in-
appropriate: Referring to the analysis of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, they wrote: "The validity of
the Court's holding thus depends on the degree of acceptance given these ancient debates by
each analyst." Kates & Kouba, supra note 11, at 136.
53. 17 Stat. 13 (1871). What is now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was §1 of the Act.
[Vol. 28:429
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power granted to Congress by section five of the fourteenth amendment 54 to
enforce section one of that amendment. 55  As the bill proceeded through
Congress, Senator Sherman of Ohio introduced an amendment that would
have made every citizen of a municipality liable for the lawlessness perpe-
trated by its residents. 56 In the postbellum South, however, municipalities
generally did not engage in a peacekeeping function. 57  Because of the doc-
trine of coordinate sovereignty,58 the liability placed on municipalities under
this amendment was rejected. Congress refused to impose upon a municipal-
ity an obligation that was not compelled by state law. 59  Based on that rejec-
tion, the Court in Monroe refused to include municipalities within the ambit
of the term "person" in section 1983 and thereby established the municipal
immunity doctrine.
60
In Monell, the Supreme Court found the Monroe construction of section
1983 to be erroneous. 61 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, indicated
that the 42nd Congress had no objection to holding a municipality liable for
its failure to fulfill the obligation to maintain order that was created by state
law. 62 The precedent relied upon by the opposition to the Sherman
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 provides: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this Article."
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in pertinent part:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
As Justice Douglas eloquently stated in Monroe:
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a
federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect,
intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens
to the enjoyment of rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.
365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961). The 42nd Congress was responding in general to violence perpetrated
by the Ku Klux Klan in the Reconstruction South, and, in particular, to a message from Presi-
dent Grant urging it to promulgate legislation to ameliorate those conditions. Id. at 172-73.
56. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 663 (1871).
57. Kates & Kouba, supra note 11, at 134-35.
58. According to this doctrine, limitations were placed on the powers of the federal gov-
ernment to protect state prerogatives. 436 U.S. 658, 676 (1978).
59. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 788, 792-93, 795 (1871).
60. 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961).
61. 436 U.S. at 679-90. In so holding, the Court joins a host of commentators who have
criticized the Monroe construction. See Kates & Kouba, supra note 11, at 132-36; Levin, supra
note 9, at 1491-94, .1591-31; Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Sec-
tion 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 455-56 n.33
(1978); Developments in the Law, supra, note 9, at 1192; Developing Governmental Liability
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1201, 1212-13 (1971); Comment, Toward State and
Municipal Liability in Damages for Denial of Racial Equal Protection, 57 CAL. L. REV. 1142,
1164-69 (1969).
62. Justice Brennan relied on passages from the Congressional debates. One such passage,
(from the remarks of Senator Poland), is particularly instructive:
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amendment's imposition of a new duty on a municipality, 63 he reasoned, did
not pertain to the enforcement of an existing legal duty, and the two there-
fore could not be equated.6 4 Also, he argued that a municipality's legal
duty could be enforced by analogy to the enforcement of the contract clause
against local governments, 65 and showed that the 42nd Congress would have
understood the word "person" to include legal, as well as natural, per-
sons.6 6 The Monell Court's reading of the legislative history of section 1983
clearly refutes that of the Monroe Court and its analysis was of greater depth
than that of Monroe.6 7
IMPACT OF MONELL
Clearly, by overruling the Monroe municipal immunity doctrine, the Su-
preme Court has reduced significantly the tension which has permeated the
I presume, too, that when a state had imposed a duty upon a municipality, and
provided they should be liable for any damages caused by failure to perform such
duty, that an action would be allowed to be maintained against them in the Courts
of the United States under the ordinary instructions as to jurisdiction. But enforcing
a liability, existing by their own contract, or by State law, in the courts, is a very
widely different thing from developing a new duty or liability upon them by the
national Government, which has no power either to create or destroy them, and no
power or control over them whatever.
CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 794 (1871). 436 U.S. at 679-83 (1978).
63. Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870); Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24
How.) 66 (1860); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). These cases later were
overruled by Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939); Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339 (1879).
64. 436 U.S. at 672-83.
65. Id. at 681-82.
66. Id. at 687-89. Justice Brennan relied on the understanding of the Dictionary Act, passed
a few months before § 1983. That Act provides in pertinent parts "in all acts hereinafter passed
... the word 'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate ... unless
the context shows that such words were intended to be used in a more limited sense." Act of
Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 12 Stat. 431 (1871). Id. at 688-89. Justice Brennan also points out
that the 42nd Congress intended § 1983 to be broadly construed. Id. at 700.
67. In this dissent, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, conceded that the
majority was "probably correct" in demonstrating that the grounds for the opposition to the
Sherman amendment were not the same as the desire to enforce a municipality's legal obliga-
tion. 436 U.S. 658, 722 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Also, he admitted that the rejection of
the amendment did not necessarily indicate how Congress felt about including a municipality
within the term "person" and that "the reasoning of Monroe on this point is subject to chal-
lenge" as a result. Id. at 723.
His objection to the majority's construction is tied to his perception of the doctrine of stare
decisis. He believed that the legislature should correct the wording of the statute if it felt
corrections were needed. Id. at 714-19.
The majority also recognized the importance of stare decisis. Nevertheless, it noted that sev-
eral factors necessitated the overruling of Monroe. 436 U.S. at 695-701. As Justice Powell
wrote in his concurrence, "'[I] think we owe somewhat less deference to a decision that was
rendered without benefit of a full airing of all relevant considerations [including the legislative
history]." 436 U.S. at 709 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring).
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federal courts. Persons whose constitutional rights have been violated by the
execution of a policy, rule or regulation or by "governmental custom," can
sue the local governmental entity directly for legal and equitable relief.68
There now is a responsible government defendant from whom a section 1983
plaintiff may recover. Further, since Monell, the Court has vacated three
appellate court decisions upholding municipal immunity under section 1983
and remanded them for further consideration. 69
Also, the Court has directly addressed the eleventh amendment questions
that had been raised in section 1983 litigation. In Hutto v. Finney,70 a deci-
68. The Court did not reject the holdings of Moor, that § 1988 does not create a federal
cause of action to enforce § 1983, or Kenosha, that there can be no bifurcated application of
relief from a local government entity. 436 U.S. at 701 n.66. That fact is entirely consistent
with the overruling of the municipal immunity doctrine and does not negate the impact Monell
has on ameliorating the past confusion in the lower federal courts. A § 1983 plaintiff now can
sue a local government entity directly. Also, the Court recognized official capacity suits, holding
"[I]ocal government officials sued in their official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983 in those
cases in which, as here, a local governmnt would be suable in its own name." Id. at 690
n. 55.
69. In the first case, Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 98 S. Ct. 3117 (1978), firemen and
policemen sued the City of San Antonio, the pension fund board of trustees, and the individual
trustees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as well as return of
their mandatory contributions to the city pension fund. The Fifth Circuit originally followed the
official capacity approach and allowed recovery from the trustees. 520 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1975).
That decision was reversed in a hearing en banc as the Court employed the eleventh amend-
ment analogy to bar the recovery that would come from the city treasury. 528 F.2d 499 (5th
Cir. 1976).
In this second case, Thurston v. Deckle, 98 S. Ct. 3118 (1978), nonprobationary city
employees filed a class action against certain city officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, attacking the
suspension and dismissal rules of the City of Jacksonville, Florida, seeking declaratory and in-
junctive relief and back pay. They claimed they had been denied due process for being termi-
nated without adequate procedural safeguards. 531 F.2d 1204, 1266 (5th Cir. 1976). The Fifth
Circuit agreed but held it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim for back pay that
ultimately would come from the city's treasury because of the municipality's § 1983 immunity.
Id. at 1269. The Fifth Circuit in turn remanded to the district court. 578 F.2d 1167 (5th Cir.
1978).
In the third case, City of Independence, Mo. v. Owen, 98 S. Ct. 3118 (1978), a discharged
police chief sued the City of Independence, the city manager, the mayor and councilmen under
the fourteenth amendment and under § 1983 for declaratory and injunctive relief and back pay.
He claimed he was denied due process in being discharged without notice or a hearing. 560
F.2d 925, 926 (8th Cir. 1977). The Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiff could bring a cause of
action directly under the fourteenth amendment and could recover back pay from funds under
the defendant officials' control as part of an equitable decree. Id. at 937. However, the court
held that an action against the city was barred by the municipal immunity doctrine. Id. at 931.
In all these cases, the courts, to be consistent with Monell, likely would hold the cities liable
under § 1983.
70. 98 S. Ct. 2565 (1978). In this case, state prisoners filed suit under the eighth amend-
ment against Arkansas state prison officials claiming that conditions in their cells violated the
cruel and unusual punishment clause. The Supreme Court affirmed the appeals court finding of
unconstitutional practice and its award of attorney's fees from the State Department of Correc-
tion. Id. at 2576.
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sion handed down shortly after Monell, the Court rejected the utilization of
the eleventh amendment to deny monetary awards from state treasuries.
71
Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion in Hutto, stated that "it is surely
at least an open question whether section 1983 properly construed does not
make the States liable for relief of all kinds, notwithstanding the eleventh
amendment." 72
Although less obvious, Monell also will -affect other areas of at least equal
significance. These areas include pendent party jurisdiction, suits against
school boards under section 1983 and the Burger Court approach to civil
rights.
Impact on Pendent Party Jurisdiction
Monell is likely to have a significant impact upon judicial applications of
the doctrines of pendent 73 and ancillary 74 jurisdiction. It casts serious doubt
that the third of Monroe's progeny, Aldinger v. Howard,75 an important
decision involving these doctrines, would be decided in the same way today.
The Court in Aldinger was confronted with the earlier decision of United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 76 and subsequent lower court precedent. 7 7 In
Gibbs, the plaintiff filed suit in federal district court claiming a violation of
federal law and a pendent state claim asserting a violation of Tennessee law
against the same defendant. 78 In deciding that the federal district court had
jurisdiction over both claims, the Supreme Court devised what has come to
71. Id.
72. Hutto v. Finney, 98 S. Ct. 2565, 2581 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan
was relying on Monell and Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). Claiming the state's re-
tirement plan discriminated against them on the basis of sex, employees of the State of Connec-
ticut brought a class action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court held that
the eleventh amendment was not a bar to an award of backpay because it was limited by the
provisions of § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. See text accompanying note 135 infra.
73. Under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, a federal plaintiff may bring both a single
federal action and a state claim arising from the same set of facts against one defendant. The
rationales for this doctrine are convenience to both parties and economy of judicial resources.
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1966). See also J. WRIGHT, LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS 62-65 (1970).
74. According to the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction,
[i]t is held that a district court acquires jurisdiction of a case or controversy as an
entirety, and may, as an incident to disposition of a matter properly before it, pos-
sess jurisdiction to decide other matters raised b, the case of which it could not
take cognizance were they independently pressed. Thus if the court has jurisdiction
of the principal action, it may hear also any ancillary proceeding therein, regardless
of the citizenship of the parties, the amount in controversy, or any other factor that
would normally determine [subject matter] jurisdiction.
J. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 19 (1970).
75. 427 U.S. 1 (1976). See note 27 supra.
76. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
77. See note 89 infra.
78. Id. at 720.
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be known as the "power-discretion" test. 79 The threshold requirement, the
power element, is that a substantial federal claim 80 and a state claim must
be derived from a "common nucleus of operative fact." 81 If they are, the
federal court then may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over both claims.
But as Justice Brennan noted, "pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discre-
tion, not of plaintiff's right."s 2 Therefore, according to Gibbs, the court
should use discretion, the second element of the test, to decide if it will
hear the state law claim. The factors to be weighed in exercising discretion
were held to be judicial economy, convenience and fairness.8 3
Subsequent to Gibbs, lower federal court decisions have synthesized the
doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. They have done so by ex-
tending pendent jurisdiction to diversity cases 84 and to pendent party
cases, 8 5 areas previously only within the ambit of ancillary jurisdic-
tion. 86 Pendent party jurisdiction, significant in the context of Aldinger, has
been defined as "[t]he expansion of pendent jurisdiction to include state
claims against parties not involved in the jurisdiction-conferring action." 87
As a result of the Gibbs and post-Gibbs decisions, not only could a federal
court hear a federal claim and a state claim together against the same defend-
ant, it also could adjudicate the interests of additional parties to the state
law claim. 88 In fact, faced with pendent party questions, as was the Court in
Aldinger, a majority of the circuits have upheld the exercise of jurisdiction
79. Comment, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Towards a Synthesis of the Two Doc-
trines, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1263, 1272-73 (1975).
80. Such a claim would be one over which a federal court would have subject matter juris-
diction. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725(1966).
81. Id. The claims would be such "that a plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try them
all in one judicial proceeding." Id.
82. Id. at 726.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Atlantic City Hosp., 392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1968). In that case,
the court held, "These considerations [the power-discretion test elements] seem as applicable to
cases in which federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship as to federal question
cases." Id. at 155.
85. See, e.g., Astor Honor, Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1971). As
Judge Friendly noted, "Although the pendent claim in Gibbs did not include a party not named
in the federal claim, Mr. Justice Brennan's language and common sense considerations underly-
ing it seem broad enough to cover that problem also." Id. at 629.
86. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1976).
87. Comment, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Towards a Synthesis of Two Doctrines,
22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1263, 1277-78 (1975). In this Comment, the author analyzes the trend
toward the synthesis of the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. The gap between
what historically were two separate doctrines began to be closed in Gibbs. It was further nar-
rowed, according to the author, by the extension of pendent jurisdiction to diversity cases and
to pendent party cases. Id. at 1274-81. The author argues further that pendent jurisdiction,
specifically the Gibbs power-discretion test, should be extended to cross-claims and coun-
terclaims. Id. at 1281.
88. See Currie. Pendent Parties, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 753, 754-55 (1978) (cogent analysis of
whole pendent party area).
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over the pendent party by the federal court. 89 Those circuits that have not,
relied on pre-Gibbs precedent which was much more restrictive in allowing
such an exercise of judicial power. 90
In Aldinger, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted that a fed-
eral court might entertain a pendent party where Congress, by statute, had
conferred jurisdiction. 9 1 But confronted with the facts of Aldinger, he
reasoned that because counties were immune from the jurisdictional reach of
section 1983, in compliance with Monroe and Kenosha, they could not be
joined as a pendent party. 92 As such, Aldinger can be interpreted as a
further manifestation of the Court's philosophy of keeping local governmen-
tal entities out of federal court in civil rights litigation. 93
By contrast, Monell could be viewed as representing a significant shift in
the Court's attitude toward municipalities in general under the Civil Rights
Statutes 94 and toward local governmental entities as pendent parties in par-
ticular. Prior to Aldinger, a plaintiff would have to attempt the pending of a
local governmental entity to a state claim in order to get that body into
federal court. Now, after Monell, the plaintiff can sue the municipal corpora-
tion directly under section 1983. Thus Monell has severely weakened the
foundation upon which Aldinger stood.
Moreover, circumstances will remain in which a plaintiff may want to at-
tach a local governmental entity to a state law claim. For example, if a sec-
ondary school teacher were to be discharged from his or her position be-
cause of race, that person likely would bring a federal claim against the
president or chairman of the school board under section 1981. 9 5 He or she
89. See, e.g., Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995
(1974); Transok Pipeline Co. v. Darks, 565 F.2d 1154 (10th Cir. 1977) (the case was decided
after Aldinger); Florida E.C.R.R. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1975); Schulman v.
Huck Finn, Inc., 472 f.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1973); Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir.
1971); Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971); Beautytuft, Inc.
v. Factory Inc. Ass'n, 431 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1970); Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir.
1968).
90. Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917
(1974); Aldinger v. Howard, 513 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1975). See Hurn v. Ousler, 289 U.S. 238
(1933); Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
91. 427 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1976).
92. Id. at 17. The Court held, "[iun short, as against a plaintiff's claim of additional power
over a 'pendent party,' the reach of the statute conferring jurisdiction should be construed in
light of the scope of the cause of action as to which federal judicial power has been extended by
Congress."
93. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
94. E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1985 (1970).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be sub-
ject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
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might also bring a state law claim against the school board and/or city for
violation of contract. Because in many states there is compulsory joinder of
both parties, the plaintiff would join the municipality as a party to the state
claim. They might also join that body in an attempt to ensure recovery, as
the school board might not carry sufficient insurance protection. It could be
argued that after the -Court's apparent philosophical shift in Monell, if all
other requirements were met,96 the federal court hearing the section 1981
suit should allow the municipality to be brought in as a pendent party sub-
ject to possible liability.
The Court in Monell did not address these factors directly. Based on
Monell and the majority of the post-Gibbs lower federal court decisions,
however, a strong argument can be made that the opinion will have a sig-
nificant impact on this important area of federal court jurisdiction. 97
Impact on Suits Against School Boards
Monell also clarified the relationship of a school board to a municipal cor-
poration. The Supreme Court had left open the question of whether a school
board was a "person" under section 1983.98 The lower courts were divided
in their answer 99 and hinged their determination on the board's dependence
on, or independence from, the municipality. The Monell Court's holding
that a school board is not to be distinguished from a municipality for section
1983 purposes 100 should put an end to the debate on the status of school
boards in section 1983 actions. 1 1 They are now "persons" under the Act
and can be held liable under section 1983 when their policies, rules or regu-
lations cause the deprivation of constitutional guarantees. 10 2
96. The Gibbs power-discretion test. See note 79 supra.
97. See note 89 supra.
98. Mt. Healthy City School Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). In this
case, the plaintiff brought suit against the board of education under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for failure
to renew his contract in violation of his first and fourteenth amendment rights. Id. at 276. The
Court remanded the case for consideration of the due process issue and left open the question
of whether the school board was a "person" under § 1983. Id. at 279.
99. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 532 F.2d 259, 262-64 (2d Cir.
1976); Adkins v. Duval County School Bd., 511 F.2d, 690, 692-93 (5th Cir. 1975); Singleton v.
Vance County Bd. of Educ., 501 F.2d 429, 430 (4th Cir. 1974). (All holding board of education
is not a "person"). But see Keckeisen v. Independent School Dist., 509 F.2d 162, 1065 (8th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 833 (1975); Aurora Educ. Ass'n E. v. Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d
431, 435 (7th Cir. 1973); Scher v. Bd. of Educ., 424 F.2d 741, 743-44 (3d Cir. 1970). (All
holding board of education is a "person"). See also Note, Suing the School Board Under Section
1983, 21 S.D.L. REV. 452 (1976).
100. 436 U.S. at 695-96.
101. See 436 U.S. at 711-13 (Powell, J., concurring).
102. 436 U.S. at 690. As an indication of the impact of Monell, the Supreme Court recently
remanded a case brought under § 1983 against a school board for reconsideration. Kornit v.
Board of Educ., 542 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1976), vacated, 438 U.S. 902 (1978). In that case a
teacher filed suit under § 1983 alleging that the school board had unlawfully deducted pay,
because of his participation in an illegal strike, in violation of his fourteenth amendment rights.
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Impact on Burger Court Approach to Civil Rights
Finally, Monell is likely to affect the approach of the current Supreme
Court to civil rights litigation. The Burger Court has come under sharp criti-
cism for restricting access to the federal courts by individuals or classes of
persons seeking vindication of their constitutional guarantees.' 0 3 Prior to
Monell, a host of legislation was introduced in Congress to remedy the ef-
fects of Monroe and its successors on section 1983 actions.' 0 4
The Court has restricted federal protection of federally guaranteed rights
in three general areas: 105 access to federal courts, 10 6 federal court deference
to state proceedings, 10 7 and the ability of the federal courts to shape rem-
edies and provide relief for harm caused by state officials.108 Two solutions
called for, 10 9 in the context of section 1983 actions, have been: 1) the
amendment of section 1983 to include government entities within the scope
The Eighth Circuit also vacated O'Hern v. School Dist., 578 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1978), for
reconsideration.
103. See Morrison, Rights Without Remedies: The Burger Court Takes the Federal Courts
out of the Business of Protecting Federal Rights, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 841 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Morrison]; Shaman & Turkington, Huffinan v. Pursue, Ltd.: The Federal Courthouse
Door Closes Further, 56 B.U.L. REV. 907 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Shaman & Turkington];
Supreme Court Denial of Citizen Access to Federal Courts to Challenge Unconstitutional or
Other Unlawful Actions: The Record of the Burger Court, A Statement of the Board of Gover-
nors of the Society of American Law Teachers (1977) [hereinafter cited as Supreme Court De-
nial]; Wicker, Closing the Courts, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1976, at col. 3.
104. See, e.g., S. 35, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S201 (1977). Senator Mathias,
in introducing the bill, noted, "[wlhile I am aware of the concerns of the Court's new
priority-especially the growing problem of overburdened Federal Courts-I am struck by the
consistency and severity with which these decisions have hurt those most in need of judicial
relief."
105. See Morrison, supra note 103; Shaman & Turkington, supra note 103.
106. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organ.,
426 U.S. 26 (1976) (Article III "case or controversy" not established unless injury can be traced
to defendant, not a third party); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (assertion of "generalized
grievances" or third parties rights insufficient to establish injury in fact necessary to have stand-
ing).
107. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (state prisoner denied federal habeas coprus relief
where a state provided for a full and fair litigation of a fourth amendment claim); Francis v.
Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) (state prisoner who failed to make a timely challenge to the
composition of the grand jury that indicted him was barred from bringing his challenge in a
federal habeas corpus proceeding); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975) (unnamed, but in-
terested parties in a pending state proceeding could not seek federal injunctive relief absent a
clear showing that their claims could not be answered in the state proceedings); Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (greater deference given to state court civil proceedings as
well as criminal proceedings). The Court repeatedly has stressed the principles of comity and
federalism in this area.
108. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1975) (U.S. District Court order to Philadelphia Police
Commissioner to revise police manuals along court guidelines because of police misconduct was
an unwarranted federal judicial intrusion into the discretionary authority of city police to per-
form according to state law); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240
(1975) (federal court will not award attorney's fees in public interest cases where applicant is
trying to recover fees under theory that attorney is acting as a private attorney general).
109. Morrison, supra note 103, at 861.
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of the term "person," 110 and 2) the abolishment of the good faith defense in
damage actions in order to keep the individual victim from becoming a self-
insurer."' Monell provides both solutions. It demonstrates that the Court
in Monroe was incorrect in its analysis of the legislative history and, by
overruling the municipal immunity doctrine, obviates the concern of at-
tempting to recover from a government official who may possess a qualified
immunity.
There are additional considerations which highlight the impact of Monell
in the context of its increasing the .access to federal courts for section 1983
plaintiffs. As Justice Douglas stated in Monroe, section 1983 was passed to
provide a federal forum for the vindication of federal rights." 2  Further, the
federal courts are thought to be better equipped to address constitutional
questions for several reasons. 113 First, federal judges routinely decide fed-
eral questions and thereby develop a special competence in those areas." 4
Next, the federal judiciary is more isolated from the influences of the politi-
cal arena."15 Third, federal judges are more aware of the needed uniformity
110. Id. See note 98 supra.
111. This defense was articulated by the Court as,
[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive
branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion
and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably ap-
peared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based. It is the
existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all
the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified
immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974). See also Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,
314-22 (1975) (school officials liable under § 1983 only if they acted with impermissible motiva-
tion or conscious disregard of students' constitutional rights; otherwise are immune). See note 130 and
accompanying text infra.
As Justice Powell noted in Monell,
Thus, it has been clear that a public official may be held liable in damages when his
actions are found to violate a constitutional right and there is no qualified immu-
nity .... Today the Court recognizes that this principle also applies to a local gov-
ernment when implementation of its official policies or established customs inflicts
the constitutional injury.
436 U.S. at 707-08 (Powell, J., concurring).
112. 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961).
113. See Kates & Kouba, supra note 11, at 145, where it is stated:
Federal district court judges . . . deal primarily with federal law flowing from the
Supreme Court and the circuit courts of appeals. The precedents which bind them
and the superiors who guide them all focus on federally derived rights and duties.
They are, therefore, more likely, to be well versed in the interrelationships of fed-
eral due process, equal protection, and Bill of Rights rulings of recent years. A
plaintiff whose federal claim is in any way novel may expect, then, a more educated
analysis from federal courts than from state remedial tribunals-judicial or adminis-
trative.
Id. quoting Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 H.Asv. L. REv. 1352, 1357 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Chevigny].
114. Chevigny, supra note 106, at 1357.
115. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 385-87
(1821).
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in constitutional interpretations. 16  Finally, article III requirements and in-
stitutional prudential rules often inhibit review of constitutional claims by
the United States Supreme Court. 117  The Court itself has commented on
the adequacy of its review of state court decisions, noting that it is an "in-
adequate substitute for [lower federal] court determination.""11 In sum,
"both the need to safeguard against erroneous constitutional interpretation
and the need for uniformity in constitutional rights militate in favor of the
exercise of original jurisdiction in the federal courts." 119 The Monell decision
clearly furthers these ideals by providing a federal forum to section 1983
litigants seeking relief from the unconstitutional policies of local governmen-
tal entities.
Monell also can be seen to represent a significant shift in the Burger
Court's approach to the role of the federal government in this area. As Jus-
tice Brennan noted in his discussion of the legislative history, the Civil
Rights Act, of which section 1983 was a part, was introduced in the 42nd
Congress to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment.' 2 0  As the
Court held in Mitchum v. Foster: 121
Section 1983 was . . . a product of a vast transformation from the concepts
of federalism that had prevailed in the late 18th Century... The very
purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States
and the people, as the guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect
the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law "whether
that action be executive, legislative or judicial." 122
Monell clearly is a manifestation of that purpose.
QUESTIONS UNANSWERED BY MONELL
In Monell, the Supreme Court held that a local government entity no
longer is absolutely immune under section 1983 when the execution or im-
plementation of one of its policies, rules or regulations violates a person's
constitutional guarantees.' 2 3  At the same time, the Court held that
municipalities are immune under the doctrine of respondeat superior.124 As
to the degree of immunity to be afforded a local governmental entity, the
116. See McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of
Constitutional Claims, Part II, 60 VA. L. REV. 250, 264 (1974).
117. Shaman & Turkington, supra note 103, at 928.
118. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416 (1964).
119. Shaman & Turkington, supra note 103, at 929.
120. 436 U.S. at 665.
121. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
122. Id. at 242, citing Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879).
123. 436 U.S. at 690.
124. Id. at 691. See Reimer v. Short, 578 F.2d 621, 626 (5th Cir. 1978). This is a post-Monell
decision which cites Monell as changing precedent. The Court held that the city of Houston
could not be held liable under respondeat superior for alleged harrassment and unlawful
searches of plaintiff's business by police. Id. at 626.
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Court stated, "we express no views on the scope of any municipal immu-
nity..."125 Thus, the salient question left open by the decision is when, if
ever, other than under respondeat superior, may a municipality be shielded
from liability under section 1983.
There are several crucial considerations in the determination of a possible
answer to that question. Municipal corporations historically were immune
from tort liability in the exercise of their governmental function, but not in
the performance of their corporate responsibilities. 1 26  State legislatures,
anxious to abandon municipal immunity because of the difficulty in distin-
guishing the two functions, often have required municipal corporations to
obtain insurance to cover adverse judgments. 127 Monell could pose an in-
surance problem for these bodies. Some would argue that no municipality
could anticipate when the implementation of one of its policies would cause
the deprivation of another's constitutional guarantees, especially in the con-
text of a dynamic constitutional jurisprudence.12  However, those concerns
perhaps are inflated. Municipalities could, as the larger ones now do,'
29
self-insure through the development of special judgment funds. It hardly
seems fair or reasonable that an individual should be more certain of relief in
a tort action against a municipality than when his or her civil rights have
been violated.
There also are other considerations which seem to tip the balance in favor
of municipal liability. Absent such liability, a section 1983 plaintiff often is
without a remedy. It may be impossible to identify the responsible officials.
Those that can be, often are judgment-proof or have some degree of official
immunity, 130 and juries may hesitate to impose liability on a city official
whom they view as an individual just doing his or her job. 13 1 Municipal
liability thus would provide a responsible defendant from whom a plaintiff
could recover under section 1983.
In addition, municipal liability could compel government officials to be
more careful in considering the legal ramifications of their policies. The
number of suits filed under section 1983 132 would indicate that training and
125. 436 U.S. at 701.
126. 18 E. McQUILLIN, THE LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 104-05 (3d ed. rev. 1977).
127. Id. at 105.-06.
128. See Brief for Respondent at 34, Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978).
129. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 8-1-16 (1977). The City of Chicago does self-insure by the
establishment of a judgment tax fund.
130. In several instances, government officials have been held to be immune in § 1983 ac-
tions. See Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978) (federal officials); Procunier v. Navarette,
434 U.S. 555 (1978) (prison officials); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (superinten-
dent of state hospital); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (school board official); Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (governor, state university president and members of National
Guard); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (police).
131. Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitutional Violations, 89 HAssV.
L. REV. 922, 923 (1976); Kates & Kouba, supra note 11, at 142-44.
132. See note 2 supra.
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education of those officials and the adoption of general risk management
techniques would be appropriate. 133
Thus, the scope of municipal immunity/liability has been left by Monell for
determination on another day. The eagerness of many states to abandon
municipal immunity in the tort context, the need of a section 1983 plaintiff
for a responsible defendant and the value of the deterrence of future abuses
militate in favor of municipal liability, except under respondeat superior,
under section 1983.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has rejected the municipal immunity doctrine. In this
regard, Monell represents a long-overdue shift in the Court's approach to the
question of municipal liability. By immunizing governmental entities, the
Monroe line of precedent forced the federal courts into confusing positions
and denied many section 1983 plaintiffs adequate relief. Monell should clear
the air of that confusion. It also should afford litigants a responsible defend-
ant against whom they may litigate deprivations of constitutional rights in a
federal forum. Further, Monell likely will result in the deterrence of future
abuses of constitutional rights by local governmental entities.
It is clear that section 1983 was the statutory enactment of the commands
of the fourteenth amendment. As the Court noted in Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer: 134
[W]hen Congress acts pursuant to section five [of the fourteenth
amendment], not only is it exercising legislative authority that is plenary
within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority
under one section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections by
their own terms embody limitations on state authority. 135
In Monell, the Supreme Court clearly indicated that the 42nd Congress, in
acting pursuant to section five of the fourteenth amendment when it pro-
mulgated section 1983, intended to hold accountable those local governmental
entities who did not obey the commands of the Constitution.
Lance D. Taylor
133. The Court in Monell did not accept the rationales of compensation and deterrence as
justification for holding a municipality liable under respondeat superior because those argu-
ments were not strong enough in 1871 to allow passage of the Sherman amendment. 436 U.S.
at 692-95. However, these arguments are definitely pertinent in the context of holding a local
government entity liable for failing to perform a duty it is obligated by law to perform.
134. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
135. Id. at 456.
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